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IT’S NOT SO OBVIOUS: HOW THE
MANIFESTLY EVIDENT STANDARD
AFFECTS LITIGATION COSTS BY
REDUCING THE NEED FOR
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
By: Samuel Reger
ABSTRACT
Currently, the United States Supreme Court requires a fact-specific approach to determine whether a patent claim is eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101, even though, traditionally, this has been considered a question
of law. However, recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit introduced the “manifestly evident” standard. The court held that
when it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract idea, then that claim must be deemed patent-eligible subject matter.
This Comment suggests that the manifestly evident standard, or one similar
to it, will reduce litigation costs. This is because, under the current fact-specific
requirements, it may become commonplace for courts to engage in formal
claim construction, a costly pre-trial process, to decide whether these requirements are met. But under the manifestly evident standard, courts and litigants
will be able to quickly move past the often confusing section 101 to the later
sections of the Patent Act, which courts are better prepared to confront.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation has exploded over the past twenty years. Between
1991 and 2011, the number of patent filings in district courts has more
than tripled.1 And between 2010 and 2011, patent filings increased by
22%.2 To make matters worse, in 2011, the median price of patent
litigation was $5 million per side.3 The high cost of litigating patent
disputes and the increased filing rates of patent suits mean that before
adopting new rules and standards courts should not only consider precedent and policy, but also how these judicially imposed rules and
standards affect the price tag of litigation.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took the opportunity to introduce, arguably, a new standard for
determining the subject-matter eligibility of patent claims.4 In CLS
Bank International v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., the court controversially held that when it is not manifestly evident that a claim is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, that claim must be
deemed patent-eligible subject matter.5 The Federal Circuit has since
1. Chris Barry et al., PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP, 2012 Patent Litigation
Study, 6, http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Mark A. Lemley, GOOGLE + (Aug. 15, 2011), https://plus.google.com/10187340
0615458854642/posts/28fnFbnGgeV; see STEVEN M. AUVIL & DAVID A. DIVINE, AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, I-153 to I-156 (2011).
4. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Prost, J., dissenting), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
5. Id. at 1352.
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vacated this decision, but during an en banc rehearing, it will once
again decide what test the court should adopt to determine whether a
claim is a patent-ineligible abstract idea.6
This Comment suggests that the manifestly evident standard may
reduce litigation costs. Here is why: currently, the Supreme Court
mandates several fact-specific requirements to determine subject-matter eligibility, even though this determination is a question of law.7
Under the manifestly evident standard, as opposed to the current factspecific requirements, district courts will spend less time digging into
the claims to discover some of these factual intricacies because they
will have to determine only whether it is manifestly evident that the
patent claim is drawn to a patent-ineligible idea. This, in turn, may
save litigants money because the claim-construction process will not
burden them during subject-matter-eligibility determinations.
II. DESCRIPTION

OF SECTION 101 AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE EXCEPTIONS

Section 101 of the Patent Act states, “Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”8 This section of the Patent Act instructs us on what
types of inventions are patent-eligible, and inventions that fall within
the scope of Section 101 are called patent-eligible subject matter.9
On its face, Section 101 does not contain any exceptions.10 Indeed,
its scope is very broad, and famously, the Supreme Court has said that
Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything
under the sun that is made by man.”11 However, section 101 has limits,
and thus does not truly include “anything under the sun.”12 Later, the
Supreme Court said there are implicit exceptions within the text of
Section 101.13 Fundamental principles, such as the laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject
matter.14 For example, Albert Einstein would not have been able to
patent his famous method for converting mass into energy15 because,
while this was a groundbreaking discovery, it is also an unpatentable
6. CLS Bank, 484 Fed. Appx. at 559–60.
7. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1085 (2011).
8. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2011).
9. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
10. § 101.
11. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
12. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. E=mc2.
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law of nature.16 However, as the text of section 101 indicates, if Einstein had developed a method that implemented his law of nature,
then he may have been able to acquire a patent.17
Therefore, subject-matter eligibility has two primary requirements
or “hurdles.”18 First, each patent claim must fit within one of the four
statutorily mandated categories: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.19 Second, each claim must then be outside of
the judicially derived exceptions to subject-matter eligibility: “abstract
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.”20
The Supreme Court’s exception that fundamental principles are not
patentable subject matter furthers the main goal of patent law, which
is the “production, disclosure, and commercialization of socially valuable inventions.”21 This is because the rule against patenting fundamental principles prevents inventors from obtaining a patent that is
overly broad.22 An overly broad patent burdens innovation and progress because it limits the ability for subsequent inventors to improve
upon and patent new applications that use that same basic principle.23
Thus, these exceptions are critical to patent law because they promote
progress and innovation.24
However, Mark A. Lemley, a professor of law at Stanford University and a leading commentator in patent law,25 points out that patentees oftentimes incorporate fundamental principles into their patents
in new and useful ways to serve a practical end.26 And when they do
this, patentees are entitled to a patent.27 Further, it has been pointed
out that with any patent, the claims can all be stripped down or simplified to expose fundamental truths.28 But when patentees claim fundamental ideas in such a way that the claim is overly broad or lacks an
inventive concept, innovation is stifled because the inventor obtains
control, through the grant of rights, over the fundamental idea itself.29

16. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 772 (3rd ed. 2004).
17. Id.
18. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1325 (2011).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1326.
22. Id. at 1343.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1343.
25. Directory, Mark A. Lemley, UNIV. OF STAN. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.
stanford.edu/node/166497 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
26. Lemley et al., supra note 18, at 1328–29.
27. Id.
28. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2012)
29. Lemley et al., supra note 18, at 1329.
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A. How Section 101 Functions Within the Structural Setup of the
Patent Act
Section 101, according to recent Supreme Court precedent, is a
threshold test to the later sections of the Patent Act: 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103, 112 (collectively the “Later Sections”).30 Section 102 requires that
the subject matter be novel to receive a patent.31 Section 103 requires
that an invention be non-obvious.32 And, generally, section 112 describes what a patent application must contain by requiring sufficient
disclosure of the invention.33 Each of these sections has its own set of
independent and distinct requirements.34 The Later Sections of the
Patent Act each require detailed and fact-intensive inquiries to determine such things as the state of the prior art, the ordinary user’s level
of knowledge, and the actual date of invention.35 Because these sections are fact-intensive, they have been referred to as a fine-grained
filter.36 Together, Section 101 and the later sections of the Patent Act
define the requirements of patentability.37 A claim must pass each section before it can be deemed patentable by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.38
Because Section 101 is a threshold test, or an initial inquiry, before
a district court can examine the Later Sections of the Patent Act, it
functions as a filter.39 Much of the debate following the Federal Circuit’s decision in CLS Bank has focused around whether Section 101
acts as a fine-grained or coarse-grained filter to the Later Sections of
the Patent Act,40 meaning that if Section 101 were a fine-grained filter, a district court would filter out more unpatentable claims under
Section 101 because they are patent-ineligible subject matter.41 And if
the filter were more coarse-grained, more patent claims would pass by
Section 101 so that district courts could examine patentability under
the Later Sections.42
30. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
31. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2011).
32. Id. § 103.
33. Id. § 112.
34. See Golden, supra note 7, at 1055.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See U.S.C.A. §§ 101–103, 112.
38. See generally id.
39. Golden, supra note 7, at 1058–59.
40. See Brief for Clearing House Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir.,
argued Feb. 8, 2013); Principal en Banc Brief for CLS Bank Int’l & CLS Servs. Ltd. at
28–29, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. argued Feb. 8, 2013).
41. See Principal en Banc Brief for CLS Bank Int’l & CLS Servs. Ltd. at 28–29,
CLS Bank Int’l, No. 2011-1301.
42. See id.
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John M. Golden, professor of law at the University of Texas and
another leading commentator about patent law,43 describes section
101 as a coarse-grained filter that contrasts with the other sections of
the Patent Act.44 Unlike the Later Sections of the Patent Act, subjectmatter eligibility does not have distinctive or specific requirements for
the claimed invention.45 Instead, Section 101 requires that the claimed
invention fit within one of the broadly drawn categories of things that
Congress has deemed worthy of a patent.46
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
When a court determines the patentability of claims, it primarily
focuses on the text of the claim to interpret the meaning of the
claim.47 This process, which is oftentimes the most important part of
the entire pre-trial process, is known as claim construction.48 While
constructing claims, a court primarily relies upon intrinsic evidence,
which is contained within the language of the patent claim. However,
courts, after thoroughly examining intrinsic evidence, will rely upon
extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, scientific treatises, and expert
testimony.49
Claim construction, like a subject-matter-eligibility determination,
is a legal question.50 Thus, the judge, not the jury or the parties, determines the meaning of the claims through the process.51 Because claim
construction is a matter of law, appellate courts review claim construction de novo, even if the claim construction includes fact-based questions that relate to the claim construction.52
In terms of subject-matter eligibility under section 101, after a court
interprets the claims through the claim construction process, it then
categorizes the claim under one of the four subject-matter eligibility
categories.53 As Section 101 states, the patent claim must be a process,
machine, manufacture, or a composition of matter.54 But, even if a
court determines that the claim fits within one of the four categories,
if the court determines that the claim fits within one of the three fundamental principle exceptions—laws of nature, physical phenomena,
43. The UT Law Faculty, John M. Golden, UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW., http://
www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/jg33285/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
44. Golden, supra note 7, at 1058–59.
45. Id. at 1061.
46. Id. at 1058.
47. Id. at 1059.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
51. Id.
52. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
53. Golden, supra note 7, at 1059.
54. Id.
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or abstract ideas—then the claim fails the requirements of subjectmatter eligibility.55
IV. FACT-SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON THE ROAD
SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY

TO

Although the Supreme Court has said determining subject-matter
eligibility is purely a question of law, fact-specific inquiries still exist
during the process.56 The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit are
concerned with granting patents that are overly broad.57 Thus the “nopreemption” rule states that patent claims cannot preempt all the uses
of a fundamental principle.58 The no-preemption rule can cause a detailed inquiry into the scope of the patent claims to determine how
broad the claims are.59 Further, courts may also have to examine the
ability of other inventors to exploit the fundamental principle in the
future, assuming that a patent was granted.60
Closely related to the no-preemption rule is the significance filter,
which is the requirement that patent claims must contain more than
insignificant extra-solution activity.61 This means that an applicant
cannot simply claim a fundamental principle, such as abstract idea,
and then, say, apply it.62 Instead, the patent claims must contain some
sort of inventive concept that brings the claim into the realm of subject-matter eligibility.63 The significance filter and the inventive-concept requirement, because they are concerned with novelty and nonobviousness, require close inspection by district courts.64 As Professor
Golden points out, these requirements, both the no-preemption rule
and the significance filter, can involve a fact-specific inquiry into the
scope of the patent claim.65
V. PAST TESTS
A.

TO

DETERMINE SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY
UNDER SECTION 101

The Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Test

The manifestly evident standard, introduced in CLS Bank, was not
the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court’s first attempt at articulating a
55. Id. at 1059–60.
56. Id. at 1061.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; Lemley, et al., supra note 18, at 1318.
62. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
63. Id.
64. See Golden, supra note 7, at 1061.
65. Id.
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workable test to determine subject-matter eligibility.66 In 1994, the
Federal Circuit introduced the “useful, concrete, and tangible” test,
which focuses on the results of a claimed process to determine if the
claim is patent-eligible.67 In State St. Bank, the Federal Circuit applied
this test to a process that used a computer to transform data, which
represented discrete dollar amounts, through a series of mathematical
calculations into a final share price.68 The Federal Circuit said that,
because the process produced a final share price that could be recorded for reporting purposes and then relied upon in subsequent
trades, the result was useful, concrete, and tangible.69 Thus, the process, although it contained a series of mathematical formulas and calculations, was patent-eligible.70
B. The Machine-or-Transformation Test
From 1998 to 2008, patentable subject matter was a “dead letter,”
until the Federal Circuit heard In re Bilski.71 In this case, the Federal
Circuit said that the useful, concrete, and tangible result test was inadequate.72 Explaining further, the court stated that, while a useful, concrete, and tangible result may provide insight into whether a claim is
drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, the inquiry is nonetheless
insufficient to determine eligibility under Section 101.73 In its place,
the Federal Circuit inserted the machine-or-transformation test.74
Under the two-prong machine-or-transformation test, the applicant
may demonstrate that a process satisfies section 101 by showing that
the claim is either tied to a particular machine or brings about a particular transformation of a particular article.75 Under the Federal Circuit reasoning, a claim that is tied to a particular machine or
transforms a particular article does not preempt all uses of the fundamental principle because it is limited to a particular use.76 Also, under
either prong of the test, the machine or transformation must “impose
meaningful limits” and the involvement of the machine or transformation must not be “insignificant extra-solution activity.”77
With In re Bilski (Bilski I) the Federal Circuit decided whether a
business process that hedged risk in the sale of commodities was pat66. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
67. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
68. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Lemley et al., supra note 18, at 1318.
72. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (Bilski I).
73. Id. at 959.
74. Id. at 960–61.
75. Id. at 961.
76. Id. at 957.
77. Id. at 961–62.
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entable subject matter.78 More specifically, the claims were drawn to a
“financial hedging method that allows commodity users and producers
to fix their costs by shifting the risk of supply and demand fluctuation
onto other market participants.”79 The Federal Circuit held that this
business method was not patentable subject matter because the claims
were drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.80 The applicant admitted that the machine prong was not satisfied, so the court only addressed the transformation prong.81 The court said that the applicant’s
process does not transform any article to a different state or thing.82
Manipulations of legal obligations or business risks cannot meet the
test’s requirements because they are not physical objects or substances, according to the court.83
C. Bilski II and the Benson-Flook-Diehr Guideposts
In Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski II), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review In re Bilski.84 The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit, but it disagreed that the machine-or-transformation test was
the sole means of determining patent eligibility of processes under
Section 101.85 The Court stated that the machine-or-transformation
test is a useful and important clue, but it is not the exclusive means for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible process.86
The Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski II instructs patent lawyers
and judges to take a fact-and-case-specific approach to determine the
scope of patent eligibility under Section 101.87 In place of a standard
or rule, the Supreme Court instead focused on three cases that were
decided in the 1970s.88 These three cases are known as the BensonFlook-Diehr guideposts.89 Generally, these three cases are similar because they address whether patent claims, which all used a computer
to carry out a process, were patentable processes or unpatentable abstract ideas.90 A few requirements, which were briefly discussed
above, emerge from the synthesis of these three cases. First, a process
that wholly preempts a fundamental concept is unpatentable.91 Sec78. Id. at 949.
79. Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011).
80. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 964.
81. Id. at 950.
82. Id. at 963.
83. Id.
84. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (Bilski II).
85. Id. at 3227.
86. Id.
87. Crouch & Merges, supra note 79, at 1677.
88. Id.
89. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3222.
90. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 64 (1972).
91. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
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ond, a clam that includes fundamental concepts must have a substantial practical application.92 Third, extra-solution activity, no matter
how conventional, cannot transform an unpatentable fundamental
concept into a patentable process.93 Thus, instead of merely applying
extra-solution activity to a fundamental concept, the use of the fundamental concept must be tied to the process during the solution.94
D. The Inventive Concept
In the Supreme Court’s latest attempt to define the limits of subject-matter eligibility, it renewed the idea that patent claims must
“contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent
in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”95
The Supreme Court addressed the inventive-concept idea in
Flook.96 The claims in Flook comprised a method for updating alarm
limits.97 Alarm limits, according to the case, are simply numbers that
are calculated and then compared to operating conditions of a catalytic conversion process.98 If the operating conditions exceeded the
alarm limits, then an alarm would signal the presence of an abnormal
condition.99 To calculate the alarm limits, the process employed a
novel mathematical formula.100 However, the Court recognized that
the only thing inventive about this process was the mathematical algorithm itself.101 And because algorithms are not patent-eligible subject matter, they are always assumed to be within prior art, no matter
how novel they may be.102 Once the formula was assumed to be within
the prior art, no other inventive application of this algorithm existed
because the specific catalytic conversion process was well known.103
Therefore, the process was not patent-eligible subject matter, in part
because it contained no inventive concept.104
Generally, the Supreme Court imposed the inventive-concept requirement for two reasons.105 First, the inventive-concept requirement
92. Id. at 71.
93. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95.
94. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92.
95. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
96. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 594.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
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works to make patent eligibility independent of a “draftsman’s art.”106
Meaning that if the Court requires an inventive concept, it will help
prevent a skilled patent draftsman from making an otherwise patentineligible claim seem patent-eligible because the court will look more
to content rather than style.107 Second, it also helps prevent claims
that only contain extra-solution activity added to an abstract idea or
natural law from being patented.108 Claims that contain nothing more
than extra-solution activity cover a broad range of potential uses and
can unduly limit innovation.109 So the inventive-concept requirement
is another limit on the scope of patent eligibility because it requires
courts to closely examine the factual intricacies of the patent claim in
search of an inventive concept.110
VI. EXPLAINING CLS BANK V. ALICE
The Federal Circuit has remained divided on the issue of subjectmatter eligibility, even though the Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of patent eligibility in Bilski II and Mayo.111 In a 2-1
decision, the court held that a patent claim purporting to minimize
settlement risk was patentable subject matter.112 Interestingly, and as
evidence of the divide among the court, both sides cited Prometheus
to support their positions for and against the other.113
Leading up to the case, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) issued four patents to Alice Corporation.114 Collectively, these patents cover a process that eliminates settlement risk.115
Settlement risk is “the risk that only one party’s obligation will be
paid, leaving the other without its principal.”116 Alice Corporation, in
its opposition to CLS Bank’s motion to dismiss, provided the following example: suppose that a bank in London would like to exchange
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Crouch & Merges, supra note 79, at 1688 (“All of the patentability doctrines
seek to ensure that granted patents are not overreaching but instead are given their
appropriate scope.”).
111. Jason Rantanen, CLS Bank v. Alice: The “Nothing More Than” Limitation on
Abstract Ideas, PATENTLY-O, (July 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/
07/cls-bank-v-alice-corp.html.
112. Tony Dutra, CLS Bank v. Alice: Another Federal Circuit Section 101 Decision,
Another Split, BLOOMBERG INTELL. PROP. BLOG (July 10, 2012), http://www.bna.com/
cls-bank-alice-b12884910574/.
113. Id.
114. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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£500 for $1,000 with a bank in New York.117 The London bank would
pay £500 to an agent of the New York bank, and then it would patiently wait to receive the $1,000 payment.118 Because the exchanges
between the two banks cannot occur simultaneously, there is a risk
that the New York bank will become insolvent and thus unable to pay
the $1,000 to the London bank.119 This is an example of settlement
risk.120
The risk that only one side will complete its obligation is common in
many transactions that occur between people or businesses, not just in
currency exchange.121 For example, when a lawyer performs legal
work for a client, there is a risk that the client will not pay for the
work performed.122 On the other side, when a client pays for legal
services in advance, there is no guarantee that the work will be
performed.123
Some commentators suggest that Alice’s business method, which attempts to eliminate settlement risk, is similar to the age-old concept of
employing an escrow account to reduce the risk of nonpayment or
nonperformance.124 An escrow account is “a bank account, generally
held in the name of the depositor and an escrow agent, that is returnable to the depositor or paid to a third person on the fulfillment of
specified conditions.”125 Alice’s method to reduce settlement risk,
which uses “shadow accounts,” is similar to an escrow account because both involve an arrangement where an intermediary delivers
funds when a pre-specified condition occurs.126 The similarity between
the two ideas gives rise to the argument that, collectively, Alice’s patents cover nothing more than an abstract idea.127 However, Alice contends that this method is still different from the traditional use of
117. Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss of Respondent-Appellant at 5, CLS
Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 07974).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Dennis Crouch, CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Patenting Software Ideas, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/cls-bank-v-alicecorp-patenting-software-ideas.html; Joe Mullin, Judge Blasts Colleagues for Defying
SCOTUS, Allowing Financial Patent, ARS TECHNICA (July 13, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/judge-blasts-colleagues-for-defying-scotus-allowing-financial-patent/.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 20 (9th ed. 2009).
126. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
127. See id. (“[T]his basic idea of ‘credit intermediation’ is not just abstract; it is
also literally ancient.”).
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escrow accounts because it uses a computer to carry out an exchange
in a particular way through the use of these “shadow accounts.”128
At the district court level, CLS Bank sought a declaratory judgment
stating that all four of Alice’s patents were invalid.129 After finding
that the business method claimed by Alice was directed to nothing
more than the fundamental idea of using a neutral intermediary to
minimize settlement risk, essentially escrow, the district court said that
the claims were drawn to a patent ineligible abstract idea.130
Alice timely appealed, and the Federal Circuit heard the case to
determine whether Alice’s claims were patentable subject matter.131
The issue presented in CLS Bank was whether a computer-implemented business method is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.132 In a split decision, with a strong dissent, the majority reversed the district court and held that the invention was patentable
subject matter.133
The majority, led by Judge Linn, introduced what has become
known as the manifestly evident standard.134 The Federal Circuit said
that “when—after taking all of the claim recitations into consideration—it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent
ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason
to be inadequate under Section 101.”135 The court further defined the
rule by explaining that it is inappropriate to hold that a claim is a
patent-ineligible abstract idea unless the claim can be understood as
nothing more than a fundamental truth without any limitations attaching that idea to a specific application.136 Applying the new standard,
the majority’s main point was that the presence of computer limitations in Alice’s method to reduce settlement risk prevented the court
from finding it manifestly evident that the patent claims were an ineligible abstract idea.137
The dissent, delivered by Judge Prost, offered a sharp critique of the
majority’s analysis.138 Chief among the dissent’s concerns was that the
majority seemingly broke from recent Supreme Court precedent.139
The dissent suggested that the most appropriate method, in light of
recent Supreme Court precedent, would be a case-specific determina128. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 1–2, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp.
Proprietary Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1301).
129. See CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1345.
130. Id. at 1345–46.
131. Id. at 1345.
132. Id. at 1343.
133. Id. at 1356.
134. Id. at 1343, 1352.
135. Id. at 1352.
136. Id. at 1353.
137. Id. at 1356.
138. Id. at 1356–61.
139. Id. at 1356.
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tion of whether Alice’s claims contain an inventive concept.140 And, in
an interesting comparison, Judge Prost called the new manifestly evident standard “more of an escape hatch than a yardstick.”141
Later, the Federal Circuit granted CLS Bank’s petition for rehearing en banc. On rehearing, the Federal Circuit will address: “What test
should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea’; and when, if
ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility
to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?”142 Because of the high costs of
patent litigation and the rising filing rates, it is imperative that, on
rehearing, the Federal Circuit considers not only Supreme Court precedent, but also how the new test affects litigation costs.
VII. THE MANIFESTLY EVIDENT STANDARD WILL DECREASE
LITIGATION COSTS BECAUSE IT IS A COARSE-GRAINED FILTER
Google’s amicus briefs to the Federal Circuit, addressing the issues
presented in the en banc rehearing of CLS Bank, suggest that using a
finer filter during the Section 101 analysis will save litigants money
and save the court’s judicial resources.143 Their argument goes like
this: excluding claims under Section 101 is efficient for both the litigants and the court because the issues are questions of law, so a district court may be able to quickly dispose of the claim without formal
claim construction.144 However, this argument is overly broad. It fails
to consider that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, Section 101
has become a fine-grained filter, which requires fact-specific determinations to determine subject-matter eligibility. These fact-specific requirements may cause district courts to engage in claim construction,
which is a very expensive and timely process. So, while procedurally
subject-matter eligibility determinations may remain a question of
law, the process might become more of a mixed question of law and
fact.145 However, the Author suggests that under the manifestly evident standard, the burden of these factual requirements will be reduced because the standard is relatively low and courts may be able to
move past subject-matter eligibility without claim construction at a
Markman Hearing.
140. Id. at 1360.
141. Id. at 1357.
142. Id. at 1356.
143. Brief for Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27,
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. argued Feb.
8, 2013).
144. Id. at 26–27.
145. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 727 (2010).
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A. Markman Hearings
In a Markman Hearing the district court determines the scope of
patent protection by construing, or, in other words, interpreting, the
claims through the formal claim construction process.146 However, not
all claim construction occurs during a Markman Hearing; sometimes
claim constructions can occur informally during the pre-trial process.147 Regardless, the court, not the parties or a jury, determines the
meaning and scope of the claims as a matter of law.148 Claim construction is frequently the most important step in the pre-trial process of
patent litigation because a favorable claim construction in one party’s
favor can lead to settlement or summary judgment.149
B. Why is Claim Construction so Important?
A favorable claim construction can be an important bargaining chip
because “to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide
the case.”150 For example, in patent application, an inventor claims a
method of pumping fresh water from a container to household appliances. In this situation, the inventor would try to draft the claims as
broadly as possible to cover all pumps that move water from any
container to any household appliance. Moreover, let us say that General Electric thinks that this pump infringes on their similar patent
that also pumps fresh water to a washing machine. If a court interprets
or constructs GE’s patent to cover all household appliances, and not
just washing machines, then it will have a good basis on which to move
for summary judgment against the applicant because, under the
court’s construction, the inventor’s pump is infringing.
C. The Expenses Associated with Markman Hearings and
Claim Construction
Often, the importance of a Markman Hearing makes it very expensive to litigants.151 First, both parties have to draft briefs discussing the
issues at the Markman Hearing.152 Second, parties are frequently required to conduct extensive discovery about the accused device and
it’s prior art in a Markman Hearing.153 Third, Markman Hearings can
be lengthy and are conducted at the courthouse; thus attorneys may
146. See Kyle J. Fiet, Restoring the Promises of Markman: Interlocutory Patent Appeals Reevaluated Post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 84 N.C. L. REV. 1291, 1296–97 (2006).
147. See Brief for Appellants at 4, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1403) (showing that a district court
interpreted claims, just not at a Markman Hearing).
148. See Fiet, supra note 146, at 1292–93.
149. Id. at 1296–97.
150. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
151. See Fiet, supra note 146, at 1292.
152. See Menell, supra note 145, at 796.
153. See id. at 792; see Golden, supra note 7, at 1059.
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have to bill many hours and travel expenses to other parts of the country to complete the hearing. Fourth, Markman Hearings frequently require parties to conduct extensive discovery about the nature of the
accused device and of its prior art.154 Lastly, in order to bolster the
pleadings, the attorneys may employ expensive experts during the
hearing.155
D. How Common Is Claim Construction in Subject-Matter
Eligibility Determinations?
Even though the Supreme Court recently advocated for a fact-specific approach to subject-matter eligibility, recent case law does not
support the proposition that district courts have engaged in formal
claim construction at Markman Hearings to uncover the factual requirements. However, there is some indication that courts have engaged in informal claim construction or are at least aware that claim
construction may be necessary to determine subject-matter eligibility.
1. Claim Construction After Bilski II and Prometheus
In fact, in Prometheus, the district court did engage in some claim
construction, although not at a formal Markman Hearing, to determine patent eligibility.156 In a brief to the Federal Circuit, the appellee
said that there was no Markman Hearing, but the court’s summary
judgment hearing was “essentially a Markman Hearing.”157 At this
hearing, the parties described in detail the meaning of the disputed
terms of the asserted claims; because of this, Prometheus was successful in obtaining a broad construction of the claims.158 Additionally, in
CLS Bank, instead of conducting a Markman Hearing, CLS Bank
agreed to a favorable claim construction for Alice to save time before
the court made its ruling on summary judgment.159 This indicates that
the parties in CLS Bank were at least aware of the fact that claim
construction was imminent if the parties did not come to an agreement. Further, it shows that litigants will try to avoid the process—
presumably because it saves money and time—even if it gives the
other party an edge.
154. Menell, supra note 145, at 792.
155. Id.
156. Brief for Appellant at 4, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs.,
628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1403).
157. Brief for Appellees at 7, Prometheus, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 20081403).
158. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150).
159. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 236 n.6
(D.D.C 2011) (“I will say even as to Markman our briefing will assume a broad construction favorable to Alice, so we’re going to assume that in arguing whether this is
really a patentable subject matter or not so that we can expedite that.”).
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2. Chief Judge Rader’s Thoughts on Claim Construction During
Subject-Matter Eligibility Determinations
Case law may not clearly support the idea that claim construction
has become commonplace for determining subject-matter eligibility.
But Chief Judge Rader, of the Federal Circuit, thinks that claim construction might be vital under the current eligibility requirements.160
In Bancorp, Chief Judge Rader stated that “it will ordinarily be desirable—and often necessary—to resolve claim construction disputes
prior to a [Section] 101 analysis, for the determination of patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the
claimed subject matter.”161 And Chief Judge Rader also recognizes
that the coarseness of Section 101 is directly related to whether claim
construction will be necessary.162 In Ultramercial, he said, “because
eligibility is a ‘coarse’ gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter
categories for patent protection, claim construction may not always be
necessary for [Section] 101 analysis.”163 Taken together, Chief Judge
Rader’s comments indicate that, under the current factual requirements for subject-matter eligibility, claim construction is often necessary, and that the coarseness of Section 101 affects whether claim
construction will be required.
3. The USPTO’s Stance on Claim Construction During SubjectMatter Eligibility Determinations
Another persuasive leader in the patent world—The United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)—argues that, currently, claim
construction should be required for certain eligibility determination.
The USPTO advocates for claim construction as the first requirement
to determine patent eligibility for computer implemented method
claims.164 In fact, the USPTO made this argument during oral arguments for the en banc rehearing of CLS Bank.165 Nathan Kelly, appearing for USPTO as amicus curiae, stated that a bright-line
approach to deciding patent eligibility is unworkable and contrary to
recent Supreme Court precedent.166 Instead, Kelly suggests that the
courts should “dig into the claims themselves,” presumably through
160. Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Sun Life Ass’n Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266,
1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
161. Id.
162. Ultramercial, L.L.C. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 657 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
163. Id.
164. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, FEDERAL CIRCUIT HEARS ORAL ARGUMENT OF
COMPUTER IMPLEMENTED METHODS AND SYSTEMS (2013).
165. Oral Argument at 26:00, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., 768
F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 2011-1301), available at http://cafc.uscourts.gov/
oral-argument-recordings/2011-1301/all.
166. Id.
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claim construction, to determine if a computer is actually inseparable
from the claim’s abstract idea.167
In summary, claim construction to determine subject-matter eligibility is not unheard of. First, Chief Judge Rader has written that claim
construction may be desirable—and often necessary—to resolve claim
construction disputes prior to a Section 101 analysis. Next, some
courts recently engaged in informal claim construction leading up to a
subject-matter eligibility determination. Last, the USPTO suggests
that claim construction should be the first step to determine patent
eligibility for computer implemented method claims. All three of
these examples indicate that claim construction used to determine
subject-matter eligibility may become routine in the near future. Why
is this? Since Bilski II and Prometheus, the Supreme Court has mandated fact-specific inquiries, such as the inventive concept requirement, to determine subject-matter eligibility. These requirements have
begun to transform Section 101 from a coarse-grained filter to a finegrained filter, much like the fact-intensive later sections of the Patent
Act—sections 102, 103, and 112.
E. The Effect of Section 101 as a Coarse-Grained Filter
1. Avoiding Claim Construction
So how does using Section 101 as a coarse-grained filter affect litigation costs? Google thinks that it will increase overall litigation costs.168
In its amicus brief to the Federal Circuit, it stated that “deferring consideration of [patentability] would unnecessarily subject defendants to
expensive discovery, claim construction, and other litigation costs concerning, among other things, the other requirements for patentability
found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.”169 However, contrary to
Google’s argument, addressing the issue of patentability under Section 101 might not save litigants money. Consider that, under the current factual requirements for subject-matter eligibility, a district court
may have to engage in claim construction to determine if the requirements were met. Thus, Google’s point that it may be able to avoid
claim construction under Section 101 might not be accurate. However,
if a coarse-grained filter were employed, such as the manifestly evident standard, then districts courts could move past Section 101 without examining the factual intricacies of the claim.
The underlying problem in Google’s statement is that it assumes
that if a fine-grained filter were employed, courts would still be able to
determine patent eligibility without claim construction. However, the
167. Id.
168. Brief for Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27,
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary, No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. argued Feb. 8,
2013).
169. Id.
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opposite is more likely true. When district courts are faced with complex patent claims, such as business-method patents or process patents
in the medical field, and then required to locate specific factual elements, they will likely have to construct the claims (either formally or
informally) to determine if the claims are subject-matter eligible.
2. Shifting the Analysis to the Later Sections of the Patent Act
Using a coarse-grained filter will not only save money by avoiding
claim construction, but it might also save money by shifting more of
the analysis to the later sections of the Patent Act.170 Dennis Crouch,
an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri School of
Law and the editor of the popular patent law blog: Patently-O,171 and
Robert P. Merges, a Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professor of
Law and Technology, Co-Director, Berkeley Center for Law and
Technology,172 suggest avoiding Section 101 unless it is absolutely necessary.173 Crouch and Merges believe that any claim can be invalidated within the later sections of the Patent Act to avoid potential
controversial and complex requirements for patentability within Section 101.174 Offering some empirical data to support their idea, the
authors write that in a recent study, which examined the prosecution
history files of over 1,500 recently issued U.S. patents, 84% of the
patent applications that had been rejected for lacking subject mattereligibility were also rejected as either anticipated or obvious.175 Thus,
84% of claims that failed under subject-matter eligibility also failed
under the Later Sections.176 In their own study, Crouch and Merges
reviewed 117 patent applications from the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences.177 They found that 94% of claims that were questioned on the grounds of subject-matter eligibility were also rejected
because of different requirements for patentability.178 These two studies suggest that even if Section 101 were avoided, as Crouch and
Merges advise, or if the fact-specific requirements of Section 101 were
relieved, as the Author proposes, then there would still likely be
grounds to find claims unpatentable under one of the Later Sections
of the Patent Act. These studies are notable because they help to mitigate the concerns that under the manifestly evident standard there
170. Crouch & Merges, supra note 79, at 1681.
171. Faculty, Dennis B. Crouch, UNIV. OF MO. SCH. OF L., http://law.missouri.edu/
faculty/directory/crouchd.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
172. Faculty Profiles, Robert R. Merges, BERKELEY L. UNIV. OF CAL., http://www.
law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=297 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2013).
173. Crouch & Merges, supra note 79, at 1682–83.
174. Id. at 1674.
175. Id. at 1686.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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would be an increase in patents that are overly broad or patents that
preempt future innovation.
Contrary to the Author’s belief, Crouch and Merges also suggest
that Section 101 is not truly an initial inquiry. They propose that
courts do not need to examine subject-matter-eligibility issues before
examining the Later Sections of the Patent Act.179 This, combined
with their theory that any claim can more easily be invalidated under
another section, means that district courts should simply avoid Section
101, unless absolutely necessary.180 However, part of the Author’s argument rests on the idea that district courts are required to examine
Section 101 prior to examining the later portions; thus avoidance is
not possible.
In the Author’s opinion, case law indicates that a Section 101 issue
must be dealt with first. In Diehr, the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta,
called Section 101 a threshold.181 Later, in Bilski II, the Supreme
Court again said that “Section 101 imposes a threshold condition”
such that no patent is available unless it falls in one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter.182 In State St. Bank, the Federal Circuit said that “[t]he first door which must be opened to the
difficult path to patentability is [Section] 101.”183 Furthermore, many
recent Federal Circuit cases refer to Section 101 as a threshold requirement.184 Additionally, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines
threshold as: “the place or point of entering or beginning.”185 Therefore, if subject-matter eligibility issues exist, those issues must be dealt
with prior to advancing to the later sections of the Patent Act.
Assuming that Section 101 is truly a threshold or initial inquiry, the
coarse-grained filter will save litigants money because district courts
could move quickly past confusion involving Section 101 confusion
and then deal with other, less controversial sections.186 Crouch and
Merges point out that it makes sense to deal with the “easier” issue
first because doing so is more efficient and it preserves the “scarce
179. Id. at 1679.
180. Id. at 1681.
181. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
182. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010).
183. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
184. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Classen Immunotherapies,
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
674 F.3d 1315, 1335 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Perkinelmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., No. 20111577, 2012 WL 5861658, at *72 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2012).
185. Dictionary: Threshold, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/threshold (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
186. See Crouch & Merges, supra note 79, at 1674. This argument may bolster
Judge Prost’s statement that the manifestly evident standard is more of an escape
hatch than a yard stick. The Author is certainly not arguing that the manifestly evident standard is the best standard, only that it may help litigants realize a cost savings.
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currency of court legitimacy.”187 A coarse-grained filter at the subjectmatter-eligibility stage would further both of these reasons. For example, if a claim is clearly invalid under Section 103 because it is not
useful, but it might also be an abstract idea, then courts applying the
doctrine of avoidance would not be required to dissect the claims to
discover an abstract idea. It could simply move past Section 101 and
deal with Section 103.188
A possible issue with this argument is that the Author assumes that
litigants will realize a cost savings if a district court can find invalidity
under one of the later portions of the Patent Act, instead of Section
101. To be clear, determining validity under the Later Sections can be
an “arduous undertaking,” which will likely include claim construction.189 Also, the Author argues that a course-grained filter standard
would avoid the costly judicial process involved with claim construction. So why is it still more efficient to move past Section 101 if litigants will still encounter claim construction expenses while addressing
the later sections of the Patent Act? As Crouch and Merges point out,
it still makes sense for the court to deal with the “easier” issue, and
address the costly and confusing subject-matter eligibility if necessary.190 So, the “easier” issue is more likely to be found in the Later
Sections.191 If this is true, then it makes sense to use Section 101 as a
coarse-grained filter to define the limits of patent law, instead of a way
to invalidate patents, except in the most obvious of situations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Section 101’s granularity has a direct effect on costs that litigants
will bear during the litigation process. In British Airway’s amicus brief
to the Federal Circuit, the company claimed that subject-matter eligibility is “uniquely suited for early resolution at the pleadings stage”
because this question presents pure issues of law that require no claim
construction.192 However, because the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit increasingly require fact-specific inquiries for a subjectmatter eligibility determination, Section 101 becomes a fine-grained
filter, much like the Later Sections.193 While subject-matter eligibility
may remain a legal question, these fact-specific inquiries begin to
erode some of the advantages that Section 101 offers.
187. Id. at 1681.
188. Id. at 1684.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1681.
191. Id.
192. Brief for British Airways PLC et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 8, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir.
argued Feb. 8, 2013).
193. See supra Part IV.
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The Federal Circuit’s manifestly evident standard may not be the
paramount standard to determine eligibility, but it can help ease the
burden that the current fact-specific inquiries impose on subject-matter eligibility. Although case law does not clearly support the idea that
district courts have had to recently engage in claim construction to
determine the fact-specific requirements of Section 101, some indirect
evidence exists supporting the notion that claim construction will become commonplace for subject-matter-eligibility determinations.194
Chief Judge Rader opines that claim construction may often be necessary for eligibility determinations. The USPTO argues that claim construction should be the first requirement to determine if the claim
recites only an abstract idea.195 This evidence is significant because
claim construction is an expensive process.196 The claim construction
process can involve extensive discovery, lengthy briefing, expensive
experts, and time spent traveling to the hearing itself.
However, under the CLS Bank standard, litigants can move past
Section 101, unless it is manifestly evident that the patent claims are
drawn to an abstract idea; thus, the litigants avoid spending unnecessary amounts of time constructing claims. If Dennis Crouch and Robert Merges are correct that the easier and more cost-efficient issues on
the road to patentability lie in the Later Sections, then this rule will
end up saving litigants both time and money.197
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra Parts VII.D.1–3.
Id.
See supra Part VII.C.
See supra Part VII.E.2.

